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ABSTRACT 
In asserting that the number of firms reporting small profits is abnormally high, thus 
suggesting that earnings management has taken place, accounting researchers assume that the 
distribution of reported earnings should be smooth for unmanaged earnings. This has never in 
fact been demonstrated. 
This article seeks to confirm this assumption through a laboratory experiment, and also sets 
out to identify the general distribution pattern to be expected for unmanaged earnings. Normal 
distribution does not appear to be a good fit. The study's results also highlight the existence of 
downward management of earnings by firms with higher-than-average profits. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the late 1990s, one stream of accounting literature has focused on the distribution of 
earnings reported by firms. It is also referred to as the literature on accounting thresholds, or 
earnings management to meet an objective. Researchers estimate that every year the number 
of firms reporting small profits is abnormally high, and the number of firms reporting small 
losses is abnormally low. This suggests that a significant number of firms manage their 
accounts every year to avoid reporting a loss (Hayn, 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; 
Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1999). All the studies carried out so far appear to confirm 
this. 
In reaching this conclusion, this stream of research has relied on a fundamental premise 
concerning earnings distribution patterns: if earnings are not managed, the distribution pattern 
should be smooth (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). This basic premise has never yet been 
demonstrated, as observation of unmanaged earnings is in practice impossible. The only 
earnings that can be observed are the earnings actually reported, which may have been 
managed. The “real” earnings cannot be found in any database. The smooth distribution 
premise therefore results from deductive reasoning (Vidal, 2008). Researchers can find no 
explanation why distributions of earnings, if unmanaged, display discontinuities, especially 
around the zero profit mark. 
This paper presents a study which proposes to demonstrate this assumption empirically for the 
first time. It uses an experiment-based approach in which business game participants simulate 
the management of a fictitious firm competing with other firms. They make management 
decisions, but can under no circumstances interfere with the accounts. Accounting 
manipulation is a decision made with the sole objective of modifying the earnings after they 
have been calculated or estimated. In the experimental protocol, earnings are calculated 
absolutely impartially by a software, using the same rules for all firms. One thousand six 
hundred and twenty annual earnings figures are analyzed in this way. The first finding of this 
study confirms the fundamental premise and thus supports the assumption that earnings are 
managed to avoid reporting losses. Secondary findings concerning the distribution pattern 
show that the Normal distribution does not appear to be a good fit for earnings distributions. 
 
PART 1: THE DISTRIBUTION PATTERN OF UNMANAGED 
EARNINGS 
This section discusses the pattern that unmanaged earnings distributions should follow. It 
reviews the relatively small body of literature on the subject, leading to formulation of the 
study's two research questions. 
The literature on accounting thresholds examines distribution irregularities. Discussion of 
irregularities in an earnings distribution requires conscious or unconscious reference to a 
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benchmark distribution considered "regular"1. Comparison of an empirical distribution2 with 
the expected distribution may reveal differences that are interpreted as irregularities.  
However, it is impossible to observe distributions of unmanaged earnings. The benchmark 
distribution pattern is therefore unknown. Researchers have adopted a prudent approach in 
addressing this problem, leading to non-parametric measures of the irregularities, although 
some authors still refer more or less explicitly to a Gaussian distribution pattern. A few 
authors have attempted to introduce parametric measurement approaches, making explicit 
reference to a specific distribution (Vidal, 2009). 
1.1. Studies not based on a specific distribution law 
The first approach used to examine irregularities in the reported earnings distributions is very 
much the dominant approach in the accounting literature (Burgstahler et Dichev, 1997 ; 
Degeorge, Patel et Zeckhauser, 1999 ; Brown, 2001 ; Burgstahler et Eames, 2003 ; Das et 
Zhang, 2003 ; Dechow, Richardson et Tuna, 2003 ; Holland et Ramsey, 2003 ; Leuz, Nanda et 
Wysocki, 2003 ; McNichols, 2003 ; Bisson, Dumontier et Janin, 2004 ; Glaum, Lichtblau et 
Lindemann, 2004 ; Mard, 2004 ; Brown et Caylor, 2005 ; Coppens et Peek, 2005 ; 
Burgstahler, Hail et Leuz, 2006 ; Daske, Gebhardt et McLeay, 2006 ; Roychowdhury, 2006 ; 
Beaver, McNichols et Nelson, 2007). In this approach, known as “non-parametric”, the 
parameters of the overall distribution law are unknown. However, whatever law applies, the 
researchers assume that if earnings have not been managed the distribution should be 
“smooth”.  
This approach calls for several comments: 
• It is easy to implement because it uses very few mathematical tools. Irregularities are 
measured without reference to the distribution parameters, using local estimations based 
on the observed numbers in the classes surrounding the interval studied. 
• It is robust, for the underlying conditions involve very few restrictions. Only 
discontinuities (the “peaks” or “breaks”) in the distribution are taken into consideration. 
A “strange-looking” distribution pattern will not be considered irregular as long as it 
remains “smooth”. For example, a uniform earnings distribution pattern (a totally flat 
line) would be considered regular. The notion of irregularity is restricted to 
discontinuities. 
 
                                                 
1
 Also known as the “expected distribution” or “theoretical distribution”. 
2
 Or “real” or “observed” distribution. 
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Figure 1: Example of smooth irregular distribution 
 
 
Non-parametric measures have the advantages associated with their drawbacks: they are 
straightforward and robust, but nonetheless imprecise (Chen, Lin, Wang et Wu, 2005 ; Vidal, 
2008). The reason the non-parametric approach is the most commonly used is that researchers 
are prudent. As they are unable to observe the distributions of unmanaged earnings, they do 
not take the risk of inventing the mathematical parameters of those distributions.  
1.2. Are the distributions Gaussian? 
Although researchers generally avoid the risk of explicitly proposing a distribution law for 
corporate earnings, several studies are based on an implicit assumption: distribution of 
earnings should follow a Gaussian pattern, i.e. Normal distribution. This is particularly true of 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) who measure irregularities by symmetry. Measuring 
irregularities by symmetry requires a hypothesis regarding at least one of the parameters of 
the distribution. Mard (2004) goes further, adjusting the estimations by explicit reference to a 
Normal distribution. Yet paradoxically, in both these cases, the authors highlight the 
asymmetrical nature of the empirical distributions observed. Jeanjean (1999) writes 
“Theoretically, in a sufficiently large sample, scaled earnings distribution should be normal”. 
These references to Normal distribution result from the frequent use of this law to reflect 
economic phenomena. They assume that corporate earnings are (a) data with random 
distribution and/or (b) that as there are large numbers of them in databases, the central limit 
theorem can be applied. 
(a) Corporate earnings are not random data. They depend on the firm’s actual business 
activity and its managers’ strategic decisions, which may vary in suitability. Business activity 
generates returns that are not random3. Independently of the risk factor that is omnipresent in 
almost all decisions, to rephrase Einstein, “businesses do not play dice”. Every year, the 
earnings distribution of a population of firms will therefore present characteristics that cannot 
be assumed in advance. 
                                                 
3
 Even if earnings were random, they would not necessarily follow a Normal distribution. 
The distribution is uniform  
(flat line) 
 
A non-parametric approach detects no 
irreglarities, because the distribution is 
smooth . 
 
And yet this distribution of reported 
earnings appears totally impossible.  
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(b) The central limit theorem teaches that when a large number of drawings of a variable 
following the same law are aggregated, the aggregate distribution approaches Normal 
distribution. To attain such a normal distribution, a large number of drawings need to be 
aggregated - in other words, we need to examine the distribution of corporate earnings in a 
given country over several hundred years. This is currently impossible, as no such data are 
available. In fact it will always be impossible, since the components of the population studied, 
and the economic context, undergo changes on such a scale over such a long period that we 
cannot accept the idea that the distribution of earnings will remain unchanged over the very 
long term. In other words, the central limit theorem cannot apply here. Whether or not they 
are aggregated over several years, the distribution law for earnings is unknown. 
1.3. Studies based on an explicit distribution law 
Chen, Lin, Wang and Wu (2005) paper stand out for its attempt to measure irregularities in 
distribution by using a mathematical law for earnings distribution. This paper posit (without 
explanatory arguments) that earnings should follow a mixed normal distribution. The most 
interesting aspect of these parametric approaches deserves emphasis: if the distribution law is 
known, then “parametric” measures can be introduced for irregularities. In other words, 
irregularities are measured by calculating the surface separating the expected distribution 
from the observed distribution. These measures are more precise than non-parametric 
measures, and make it possible to assess the total number of firms in an irregular position and 
the amounts that have been “managed”. These advantages, however, come with associated 
drawbacks: they depend on the relevant distribution law, which is as yet unknown. 
1.4. Research questions 
Ultimately, a dual research question is addressed. Observing the distribution of unmanaged 
earnings, the study has two objectives: 
(1) It seeks to verify the premise that an unmanaged earnings distribution is smooth 
(without discontinuities). If supported, this initial point will confirm the relevance of 
all the research on accounting thresholds since 1995.  
(2) It seeks to identify the mathematical distribution law for earnings reported by firms. 
This second point opens up the field of research to parametric methodologies for 
measuring irregularities.  
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PART 2: OBSERVATION OF REPORTED EARNINGS 
DISTRIBUTIONS 
Before presenting the results of our experimental research, it is useful to observe the 
distributions of earnings as reported (and therefore potentially manipulated) by firms, and 
review the specificities of these distributions. 
To identify and discuss any irregularities (other than local discontinuities), a benchmark 
pattern is needed. Since the relevant theoretical distribution is unknown, it is presumably 
impossible to identify irregularities. To get around this problem, we work on the reductio ad 
absurdum assumption that a Normal distribution pattern should apply. The comparison 
between the actual distribution and the normal distribution identifies zones of potential 
irregularities which are discussed.  
2.1. Differences between observed distributions and Normal distribution  
Most studies on earnings distributions observe the earnings variable scaled by a size variable 
such as total assets. However, it is of some value to begin by first observing the distribution 
pattern for unmanaged earnings. 
2.1.1. Unscaled earnings distribution 
The graphs below (see Figure 2) show the earnings distribution for French listed companies 
from 1992 to 2004 as reported in the Compustat Global Vantage database. 
Figure 2: Distribution of earnings reported by French firms 
Earnings reported by French 
listed firms from 1992 to 1994 
(as stated in the Compustat 
Global Vantage database)  
(Central portion of the 
distribution)
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(Tails of the distribution)
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Comparison of the distribution for the earnings variable with a Normal distribution having the 
same mean and standard deviation shows the following differences: 
• The empirical distribution is dissymmetrical, whereas the Normal distribution is 
symmetrical. The empirical distribution has thicker distribution tails (particularly on the 
left) than the Normal distribution. Finally, the mode for the empirical distribution lies not 
on the mean nor the median, but on the zero earnings mark. 
• The empirical distribution is more highly concentrated (leptokurtic) than the Normal 
distribution. Rather than being bell-shaped, it is shaped like an upturned funnel. There is 
a upward phase then a downward phase, but no “flat” summit. 
 
2.1.2. Scaled earnings distribution 
The earnings of French listed firms from 1992 to 1994 have been scaled by the “total assets” 
variable. The distribution is shown below (Figure 4). 
Figure 3: Distribution of earnings scaled by Total Assets 
Earnings reported by 
French listed firms from 
1992 to 1994 (source: 
Compustat Global 
Vantage database) 
scaled by total assets 
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Except for the mode, which no longer lies around zero but around the mean (mean and 
median are practically the same), the differences observed in the unscaled earnings 
distribution are also observed in the scaled earnings distribution. 
 
2.2. Discussion of the observed differences 
2.2.1. Dissymmetry 
Reported earnings follow a dissymmetrical distribution.  The dissymmetry observed in France 
is also noted by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) in 76,000 observations for US firm earnings. 
More specifically, three sources of dissymmetry are observed: large losses, a thickness in the 
distribution to the left, and smaller numbers of firms to the left of the mean. 
(a) Large losses 
There is no economic limit to a loss, but there is a limit to earnings increases. The effect of 
competition in a market economy means that a competitive advantage cannot generate 
economic rents indefinitely. Competitors will try to copy the resources that generate 
exceptional rents. Generating income necessarily requires a resource-consuming activity 
which itself generates charges. Value cannot be created out of nothing.  
However, this constraint applicable to an increase does not exist for a downward trend. It is 
technically possible to incur expenses indefinitely without generating income, and this 
automatically leads to infinite losses. The market constraint will make such a firm disappear 
rapidly, but for a few years (at least one), the firm may report very significant losses. In 
general, a firm caught up in a spiral of deficit can make extremely large losses. We cannot 
thus consider high losses as a distribution irregularity due solely to earnings management 
practices.  
(b) Thickness of the distribution on the left 
The conservatism principle may explain this dissymmetry. For Givoly and Hayn (2002), the 
broad tail in the distribution reflects accounting distrust (the conservatism principle) of high-
risk firms, whereas the low spread to the right results from a reluctance to translate good 
performance into accounting terms. Even so, can the dissymmetry be attributed to accounting 
conservatism alone? If all firms are subject to the conservatism principle in the same way, we 
would expect to see a shift towards the left hand side of the earnings distribution curve, but 
not necessarily any dissymmetry.  
But firms are not necessarily faced with risk in similar ways, and firms with worse results 
than their peers have to cope more with unfavorable events. Therefore, these firms (whose 
earnings are below the median) are more likely to suffer the consequences of the conservatism 
principle and their earnings are weighed down more by provisions. This may explain why the 
left hand side of the curve shows a steeper slope and spreads out further to the left. The 
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conservatism principle can therefore legitimately explain a dissymmetry that apparently 
cannot be considered solely as an expression of accounting manipulation. 
(c) The low numbers “just to the left” of the mean 
As we have just seen, the steeper slope to the left of the mean can be explained by the 
conservatism principle. Also, considering that firms manage a portfolio of activities, they are 
likely to discontinue their least profitable activities first, in order to concentrate their efforts 
and resources on the most profitable activities. In other words, even if accounting 
conservatism alone does not fully explain the dissymmetry, a process of economic adjustment 
leads firms to leave the left hand part of the earnings curve by managing their portfolio of 
activities in such a way as to approach the central part of the distribution curve. The theory of 
effort (Dechow, Richardson and Tuna, 2003) supports this explanation. All this suggests there 
is may be nothing abnormal about observing dissymmetry. 
2.2.2. High concentration 
The earnings show a “pointed” distribution pattern typical of high concentration. This 
concentration is located around the median and/or the mean when the variable is scaled, but 
when the variable is unscaled it lies around the zero earnings point. This observation raises 
questions as to the economic nature of the phenomenon observed: the earnings. 
(d) Concentration around the peak 
If a Normal distribution is assumed, high concentration must be considered as an irregularity. 
In other words, firms manage their accounts so they can report earnings that are close to the 
mean (median). The annual mean (median) of reported earnings could thus be interpreted as a 
new threshold that has not yet been considered in the literature.  
Explanations for this hypothesis can be imagined: publishing close-to-average earnings 
enables the firm to convey a picture of relative health, and it is not impossible that reporting 
results that are lower than competitors’ earnings involves a cost. This could encourage 
managers to aim for that level. But the concentration phenomenon could also be explained by 
the non-random nature of earnings distribution. (1) There is a certain inertia in profit levels. A 
firm that is highly profitable one year is very unlikely to make a significant loss the following 
year. It will go through increasingly difficult years before reaching a disastrous situation. (2) 
Also, in a competitive economic universe, firms are under market law pressure that tends to 
homogenize their performances. (3) The theory of effort (Dechow, Richardson et Tuna, 2003) 
can also provide an explanation for the concentration. 
It is thus natural to see high concentration around the mean in earnings distributions, and this 
phenomenon cannot be attributed solely to accounting manipulation. 
(e) Concentration around the zero earnings mark 
In the unscaled earnings distribution (Figure 3), there is high concentration around zero. This 
is largely explained by the sample composition. The sample contains many small firms and 
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few large firms. The small firms are achieving results commensurate with their investments, 
whether they are losses or profits. It may appear normal that small unscaled earnings should 
be concentrated around zero. However, there is a break in the distribution between slightly 
negative earnings and zero earnings, and this discontinuity cannot be explained by the sample 
composition. Small size should have the same effect on both the negative and positive side, 
but here the concentration is not symmetrical. 
In short, the size effect makes it difficult to interpret the unscaled earnings distribution - but 
this does not justify the high concentration of exclusively positive earnings above zero. 
2.3. Summary 
In the first section we saw that it is impossible to apply the central limit theorem in order to 
posit a Gaussian distribution pattern for earnings. Observation of published results shows that 
every year, earnings distributions have recurring characteristics (upturned funnel curve, 
dissymmetry, and concentration). These characteristics cannot apparently be attributed solely 
to accounting manipulations. For all these reasons, aggregate earnings distributions cannot be 
considered to follow a Normal distribution pattern. Until it becomes possible to observe a 
distribution of unmanaged earnings, accounting researchers will be obliged to advance with 
great caution. 
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PART 3: THE EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL 
In an ideal business world, managers take their management decisions, and accountants 
translate the effects of those decisions on the life of the firm into the financial statements with 
total impartiality. In reality, managers, who oversee publication of the accounts, may have 
motives for orienting the information disclosed to the public (Healy and Whalen, 1999; 
Breton and Stolowy, 2003). In such cases there is a presumption of earnings management. 
More specifically, accounting manipulation is considered to have taken place when there is a 
deliberate intent not to report the “real” earnings calculated or estimated impartially under 
accounting rules, but to release a different earnings figure justified by management through 
the selected accounting options (provisions, useful lives etc) or management decisions that 
they would not have made in normal circumstances (delaying or advancing investments, 
granting or refusing extended payment terms, etc). 
In a business game that simulates running an organization, it is possible to restrict participants 
to management decisions alone, in total isolation from the production of financial statements. 
But to arrive at a statistically relevant earnings distribution, the experimental protocol requires 
a very large number of simulations. The research in this paper is based on a timely 
opportunity: from the archives of an introduction to management course involving the use of 
business games, it is possible to establish the distribution of 1,641 unmanaged annual 
earnings figures. 
3.1. Presentation of the business game 
The Win-Firme business game, a teaching software developed in 1995, is used in some fifty 
schools and universities, mostly in France4. The way it works is typical of this kind of 
business game software. Participants are put into teams. Each team runs a fictitious firm that 
manufactures and sells products. Participants take operational decisions (product 
manufacturing quantities, sale price, communication and quality budgets, staff hiring and pay, 
and the research and development budget for marketing new products). These decisions are 
entered into a computer, and the software compares them with competing firms’ decisions and 
allocates consumers according to predefined parameters. 
Two aspects of the game should be highlighted. The first is that this simulation excludes 
chance. There is no random event. Yet it remains impossible to predict the future, since 
competitors’ decisions are unknown. The second important aspect is that sales are allocated 
essentially on the basis of relative decisions by the different firms. There is no right or wrong 
decision, because the algorithm is not looking for a standard solution. Therefore, whatever the 
demand parameters are, firms adjust their budgets and prices to generate profits. In other 
words, firm profitability does not depend on the game parameters but on the coherence of the 
                                                 
4
 The website www.winfirme.com describes the software and how it works.  
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team's decisions compared to its competitors. Consequently, whatever the scenario, the 
earnings distribution cannot be predicted. 
43 games were scrutinized to develop the database used for this study (see Table 1). A game 
lasts an average 5 to 6 rounds (and a round generally lasts 2 hours), corresponding to 2 to 4-
day business game seminars. The number of competing teams generally ranges from 5 to 8, 
and seminars are attended by thirty to forty students. In all, 1,620 annual earnings were 
entered to form the database. The size variables (total assets and sales) were also entered. 
Total assets (sales) amounted to zero in six (four) cases. After eliminating these data from the 
base, the scaled results provide 1,614 (1,616) observations. 
Table 1: Characteristics of games in the database 
 Number of firms Game duration Number of games Number of observations 
Mean 6.5 5.7 rounds 43 1,620 
Maximum 9 9 rounds   
Minimum 4 3 rounds   
The 43 game seminars contributing to the database took place in 23 different schools and 
universities between 2004 and 2009. Participants are students, in both scientific fields (mostly 
first-year students at engineering schools) and economic disciplines (management and/or 
economics degree students). 5 seminars were attended by students with more diverse 
backgrounds (adults on in-service training, students from other course types) as part of their 
masters qualifications in research or vocational subjects. While all participants were students 
when they attended the seminar, the mixed range of profiles avoids the bias of an over-
homogeneous population that is frequent in experimental protocols. 
Table 2: Characteristics of experiment participants 
 Science students Economics and/or 
management students 
Other  
2 years’ higher 
education 
 
3 1  4 
3 years’ higher 
education/Degree 
level 
7 8  15 
4 years’ higher 
education/Master 1 
 
1 3  4 
5 years’ higher 
education/Master 2 
7 12  19 
Other   1 1 
 18 24 1 43 
In all, nearly 1,200 participants contributed to data collection. Excluding the time needed for 
data recovery and entry, the duration of the experimental protocol can be estimated at 800 
hours.  
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3.2. The advantage of experiments 
Using laboratory-type experiments to study earnings distributions offers an enormous 
advantage: the “reported” earnings in the game are calculated by the software, without the 
participants (managers) being able to take any accounting decision. The software plays the 
role of a totally independent accountant. In the business game, earnings are not managed 
because no accounting choices are included in the game. The same rules apply for all firms. 
The accounts are a purely technical result of the firms’ business decisions.  
However, accounting options are not the only lever for earnings management. Managers may 
also use the timing of certain investment decisions to achieve an earnings objective. 
Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) use the term “direct managing”, Glaum, Lichtblau 
and Lindemann (2004) talk of “manipulation of cash flows”, Roychowdhury (2006) refers to 
“real activities manipulation”, and Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz (2006) refer to “Business 
Management”. Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) show that these practices are in fact 
dominant in business. In a business game, managers are arguably able to influence earnings 
through their R&D, communication and quality budgets. But the game is a simplified model 
of reality, and time is divided into rounds. Decisions are taken irrevocably at the start of the 
round. In other words, it is as if the decisions for year N were taken in the night of December 
31, N-1 to January 1, N. This makes it impossible to adjust budgets during the year when the 
first earnings estimates are calculated. Manipulation of cash flows to achieve an earnings 
objective is thus impossible.  
For all these reasons, use of simulations to study earnings management is particularly 
judicious. 
3.3. The limitations of experiments 
While an experiment can isolate the accounting process from attempts at opportunistic 
earnings management, it diverges from reality in that it is based on economic modeling, and 
furthermore is implemented in a teaching context. These two factors may lead to divergences 
between the earnings distribution resulting from the game and the theoretical distribution of 
actual earnings. They are reviewed below to examine how far they can be controlled for. 
3.3.1. Economic modeling 
In a simulation, the participants are players whose decisions are risk-free, as they will not 
actually experience the effects (on their pay or their career) simulated in the game. This may 
lead them to adopt different behaviors from those seen in real life. 
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This bias is limited by the fact that the software makes no assumption about performance, and 
the duration of each seminar obliges the “firms” to introduce long-term strategies. If firms 
reduce their price in the face of higher pressure from competitors, the average firm 
performances will be lower and firms will have to take the initiative of adjusting their strategy 
to improve their lot. This can come about through a downturn in competitive pressure or 
disappearance of the weakest competitors. In other words, if the competitors take greater 
risks, the effects on results should ultimately lead to compensating adjustments by 
participants, since a balance is reached without any intervention by the facilitator, or alteration 
of the software settings. 
Other possible phenomena are radical optimization strategies at the end of the game, or under-
assertive decisions at the start of the game when participants have not yet assimilated the way 
the game works. To control for this bias, the earnings distribution is also traced after 
eliminating the first and last year of the game from the database.   
3.3.2. Teaching context 
The simulations used to construct this study were originally developed for an educational 
purpose. It is interesting to examine the possible biases associated with this purpose. First of 
all, the scenarios are generally constructed such that firms are identical at the start of the 
game. Their markets generally grow in the first few rounds, so that students are not under too 
much pressure in the learning phase of the game. Generally, the industries simulate a maturity 
phase from the third or fourth round, which increases the competitive pressure and has a 
damaging effect on firm performance. While crisis phases happen in real life, their effects on 
earnings distributions are smoothed by the fact that a large number of sectors exist, and firms 
manage more diversified product portfolios than in the game. However, this bias is offset by 
the large number of games studied, and partly controlled for by eliminating the first year of 
the game.  
The game facilitator’s role can also introduce bias. Firms in difficulty generally receive help 
from the facilitator, who does not want participants to give up before the seminar is over. In 
other words, in situations where a struggling firm would go out of business in real life, in the 
game, the facilitator tends to delay that outcome as far as possible. He provides assistance in 
the form of subsidies, or advice, or possibly artificially keeping the firm alive when in reality 
its financial position would be untenable (long-term negative equity, zero industrial assets, 
astronomical debts, etc). Such situations remain infrequent, and generally only happen at the 
end of a seminar. Nonetheless, this intervention could result in overrepresentation of loss-
making firms (thick tails on the left of the distribution) in earnings distributions. This bias is 
limited by eliminating the final year of the game. 
3.3.2. Impact of methodological limitations on the object of the study 
Given the two objectives of this study, the limitations identified may reduce the relevance of 
the answer it provides for the second objective. It is possible that teaching constraints and 
economic modeling may, despite the controls applied, influence the earnings distribution 
pattern. The results of the research on the question of the distribution pattern of “real" 
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earnings must thus be considered in perspective. But there is no reason why these limitations 
should have any influence on discontinuities. In other words, whatever the limitations of the 
study, the answer it provides to the first question of whether or not there is any discontinuity 
around the zero earnings level can be considered reliable. 
PART 4: OBSERVATION OF THE DISTRIBUTION PATTERN OF 
UNMANAGED EARNINGS 
This fourth section presents the results of the study. The two research questions are addressed 
successively: (1) are there any discontinuities around the zero earnings mark in unmanaged 
earnings distributions? and (2) what do unmanaged earnings distributions look like?  
4.1. Unmanaged distributions show no discontinuities 
Figure 5 shows corporate earnings distributions derived from business games, scaled 
successively by the total assets and sales variables. Unscaled earnings distributions are not 
shown, as they are not relevant to this study. In the simulations, the 43 business games do not 
all have identical parameters. There may be considerable differences in the orders of 
magnitude used by different facilitators. For example, in one game quantities may be 
expressed in units and prices in euros, while in another with similar parameters for production 
cost and sales development structure, the production unit may be a batch of 1,000 products, 
with prices expressed in thousands of euros. In other words, value data are not comparable 
between games, as there is a possibility they are not expressed in the same units.   
Figure 4: Earnings distribution (simulation) 
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The overall pattern of the distributions is similar for both denominators. Both these 
distributions are more concentrated than a Normal distribution (kurtosis > 3) and 
dissymmetrical (skewness < 0). Although they contain data from 43 games, i.e. 43 
independent drawings, this is not a large enough number to apply the central limit theorem. 
Simple visual observation5 shows that there is no discontinuity around the zero earnings mark. 
This provides an answer to the first research question. To show this result more clearly, the 
earnings distributions for French, UK and German listed firms from 1992 to 2004 as reported 
in the Compustat Global Vantage base are traced in Figure 7. All three distributions of 
reported (and therefore potentially managed) earnings display a large discontinuity at the zero 
earnings level. There is a clear contrast with the simulated earnings distributions. 
                                                 
5
 Visual observation is clear enough to rule out the need for a statistical test, which would be problematic to 
implement since it requires a non-parametric measure of irregularity, and several methodological 
limitations have been highlighted in respect of such measures (Glaum, Lichtblau et Lindemann, 2004 ; 
Durtschi et Easton, 2005). 
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Figure 5: Distribution of earnings reported by French, German and UK firms 
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France: Distribution of 
7,742 earnings (scaled 
by total assets) 
reported by French 
listed firms from 1992 
to 2004 (source: 
Compustat Global 
Vantage database). 
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United Kingdom: 
Distribution of 14,028 
earnings (scaled by 
total assets) reported 
by UK listed firms 
from 1995 to 2004 
(source: Compustat 
Global Vantage 
database). 
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Germany: Distribution 
of 6,879 earnings 
(scaled by total assets) 
reported by German 
listed firms from 1995 
to 2004 (source: 
Compustat Global 
Vantage database). 
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The unmanaged earnings distributions resulting from business game simulations do have 
some things in common with the reported earnings distributions. They are more concentrated 
or “pointier” (kurtosis > 3) than Normal distributions, and dissymmetrical with a steeper slope 
on the left than the right, and more negative values (negative skewness). But despite these 
similarities, the simulated earnings distributions are more spread out than the reported 
earnings distributions. This difference may be caused by the smaller number of earnings 
figures generated by the simulations (1,614 compared to 6,879 to 14 028), but it could also 
result from the biases identified in section 3 above. Game participants may take more risks in 
simulations than in real life, and this may lead to overrepresentation of extreme results. 
But the most significant difference for the purposes of our study remains the absence of 
discontinuities in unmanaged earnings distributions, while all the reported earnings 
distributions show such discontinuities.  
Finally, as a control, the simulated earnings distributions are traced after elimination of the 
first and last year of the game.  The distribution pattern (Figure 9) is no different, although it 
is less smooth because of the smaller number of observations (1,054 against 1,614). 
Figure 6: Earnings distribution (simulation) after elimination of the first and last year of the game 
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4.2. Unmanaged earnings distributions do not follow a Gaussian shape  
The similarities observed (Figure 5 and Figure 7) between the distributions of unmanaged 
earnings and published earnings confirm the relevance of using simulated earnings 
distributions in seeking to identify the appropriate theoretical distribution law for earnings. 
Mathematically, identification of a theoretical law of distribution based on an empirical 
distribution is called “distribution fitting”. There are many distribution fitting softwares that 
do this. Each one contains a catalogue of laws. For each law, they measure a goodness-of-fit 
indicator (Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance, Anderson-Darling distance, and Chi-square 
distance). The laws are ranked, and it is possible to deduce a theoretical distribution (from the 
laws in the catalogue) that is the best fit to the empirically-observed distribution. 
But the fit cannot be determined from our aggregate distribution of (scaled) unadjusted 
earnings, because the law we are looking for is the distribution law for unmanaged annual 
earnings. Every year, firms’ earnings correspond to an independent “drawing”. The 
mathematical process must therefore be conducted in a situation where all other factors are 
equal, i.e. after eliminating environmental influences on economic performance. The 
proposed solution is to standardize the annual distributions before aggregating them (Vidal 
2008). This part of the study thus requires modification of the database. Each earnings figure 
is centered on the mean and reduced by the standard deviation for the source annual earnings6. 
 
                                                 
6
 Centering is on the mean rather than the median despite the fact that the mean is more sensitive to extreme values, because 
the number of firms is relatively small in each game (generally 5 to 8). This means that when there is an uneven 
number of firms (twenty cases), the median is equal to the earnings of one of the firms and as a result the class 
located exactly in the centre of the distribution after centering on the median would be overrepresented. 
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Figure 7: Earnings distribution (simulation) after standardization 
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
 
 
 
In black: Distribution 
of the 1,641 earnings 
figures resulting from 
the standardized 
simulations. 
In grey: Normal 
distribution fit for 
parameters N(0; 
0,92194). 
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figures resulting from 
the standardized 
simulations. 
In grey: Normal 
distribution fit for 
parameters N(0; 
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Two distributions are shown in Figure 11. The first relates to earnings scaled by total assets, 
and the second earnings scaled by sales. The fit to Normal distribution is illustrated by the 
curve superimposed over each graph. Two facts are clearly visible. 
The first is that the two distributions are almost perfectly identical, whichever variable is used 
for scaling. There is strong dissymmetry, but the pattern is much less concentrated than in un-
standardized distributions. 
The second is that the Normal distribution is not a good fit for these distributions, an 
observation confirmed by statistical tests (p-value is nearer to 0 than 1). The Best Fit7 
software used for distribution fitting (checking against all laws) ranks the best fits as shown in 
Table 5.  
                                                 
7
 This software published by Palisade has been totally integrated into the @risk software since 2008 and is no 
longer available separately. 
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Table 3: Fitting the annual earnings distribution (simulation) 
Function Input Weibull Logistic BetaGeneral Normal 
Shift  -4.11594    
Parameter 1  5.216468 4.59E-02 5.433517 9.29E-12 
Parameter 2  4.476426 0.534046 4.732276 0.921938 
Parameter 3    -3.3036  
Parameter 4    2.863938  
Minimum -2.4894 -4.1159 - ∞ -3.3036 - ∞ 
Maximum 2.6583 + ∞ + ∞ 2.8639 + ∞ 
Mean 0.0000 0.004224 0.045906 -0.00711 0.0000 
Mode -1.4629 [est] 0.18153 0.045906 0.044991 0.0000 
Median 0.13908 0.056762 0.045906 0.007369 0.0000 
Std. Deviation 0.92194 0.90787 0.96865 0.92066 0.92194 
Variance 0.84944 0.82422 0.93829 0.84762 0.84997 
Skewness -0.3271 -0.2831 0 -0.076 0 
Kurtosis 2.5993 2.9133 4.2 2.5523 3 
A-D Test Value (« s »)  4.588 10.89 8.25 10.6 
P Value  N/A < 0.005 N/A < 0.005 
Rank  1 4 2 3 
K-S Test Value (« s »)  0.04638 0.05681 0.05861 0.06848 
P Value  N/A < 0.01 N/A < 0.01 
Rank  1 2 3 4 
Chi-Sq Test Value (« s »)  93.12 189.8 123.7 153.1 
P Value  3.56E-07 0 0 0 
Rank  1 4 2 3 
 
The proposed distribution laws are ranked according to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which 
gives more weight to the central portion of the distribution. No law offers a statistically good 
fit. The Weibull distribution is the best fit, whichever test is used (the value of distance "s" 
between the fitted distribution and the empirical distribution is almost half the distance 
measured using Normal distribution), but the significance level remains low. This 
distribution, bounded to the left, is generally used to study lifetimes (positive values). Its 
asymmetrical aspect is what makes it a better fit than the Normal distribution, but it remains 
conceptually ill-suited because it is bounded to the left. 
The Logistic distribution comes second in the ranking of fits. It ranks above Normal 
distribution due to its more concentrated (pointier) shape. But its symmetry (like the Normal 
distribution) cannot properly reflect the observed pattern of distributions. 
Finally, a graphic representation of the standardized (scaled) earnings distribution of French 
listed firms is drawn up (Figure 8). This distribution shows significant differences from the 
simulated earnings distributions. First of all, the simulated earnings distributions are less 
“smooth”. This is explained by the smaller number of observations. Simulated distributions 
are considerably less pointed, due to the strong discontinuity observed around the zero 
earnings mark in reported earnings, which reinforces concentration (the non-standardized 
distributions in Figure 5 confirm this).   
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Figure 8: Earnings distribution (reported) after standardization 
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In black: Distribution 
of the earnings 
published by French 
firms from 1992 to 
2004, standardized 
(7,737 observations). 
In grey: Normal 
distribution for 
parameters N (0; 1) 
The final aspect noted is the high dissymmetry in simulated earnings. The peak of the 
distribution is clearly located among the positive values, whereas it tends to lie around zero 
(and therefore the median used to center distributions) for reported earnings. In the context of 
our study this is an unexpected finding, and deserves further exploration. It is as if, in reality, 
the excess number of firms making very small profits resulted from two separate avoidance 
mechanisms: avoidance of losses (which leads to the discontinuity at the zero earnings level), 
and avoidance of above-median earnings (which leads to understatement of results when they 
are good). This study thus confirms the intuition that firms build up “cushions” in profitable 
periods and use them when they fall on harder times (Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1999). 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
This study is original, being the first time a laboratory experiment has been presented for 
analysis of earnings management practices to meet thresholds.  
Its principal finding is the confirmation of a hypothesis that had not been demonstrated 
before: unmanaged earnings distributions should not present any discontinuities, and should 
follow a smooth curve. 
The second important result of this study is the confirmation that earnings distributions do not 
appear to follow a Normal distribution. The theoretical distribution pattern is more 
concentrated, and dissymmetrical. The Weibull distribution (dissymmetrical) and Logistic 
distribution (concentrated) provide a better fit, but that fit is still imperfect. These results 
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cannot however be generalized due to methodological limitations specific to the practicalities 
of the experiment. The theoretical distribution of annual earnings remains to be identified. 
A final finding is unexpected and unusual: this study shows that firms with earnings higher 
than the average reported earnings tend to manage their earnings downwards. 
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